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Abstract
We consider cooperative transferable utility games, or simply TU-games, with a limited
communication structure in which players can cooperate if and only if they are connected
in the communication graph. A diﬀerence between the restricted Banzhaf value and the
Myerson value (i.e. the Shapley value of the restricted game) is that the restricted Banzhaf
value satisﬁes collusion neutrality, while the Myerson value satisﬁes component eﬃciency.
Requiring both eﬃciency and collusion neutrality for cycle-free graph games yields other
solutions such as the hierarchical outcomes and the average tree solution. Since these
solutions also satisfy the superﬂuous player property, this also ‘solves’ an impossibility
for TU-games since there is no solution for these games that satisﬁes eﬃciency, collusion
neutrality and the null player property.
We give axiomatizations of the restricted Banzhaf value, the hierarchical outcomes
and the average tree solution that are comparable with axiomatizations of the Myerson
value in case the communication graph is cycle-free. Finally, we generalize these solutions
to classes of solutions for cycle-free graph games using network power measures.
Keywords: Cooperative TU-game, communication structure, Myerson value, Shapley
value, Banzhaf value, hierarchical outcome, average tree solution, component eﬃciency,
collusion neutrality.
JEL code: C71
1 Introduction
A situation in which a ﬁnite set of players can obtain certain payoﬀs by cooperation can
be described by a cooperative game with transferable utility, or simply a TU-game, being a
pair (N, v), where N = {1, . . . , n} is a ﬁnite set of players and v: 2N → IR is a characteristic
function onN such that v(∅) = 0. For any coalition S ⊆ N , v(S) is the worth of coalition S,
i.e., the members of coalition S can obtain a total payoﬀ of v(S) by agreeing to cooperate.
In a TU-game any subset S ⊆ N is assumed to be able to form a coalition and
earn the worth v(S). However, in most economic and political organizations not every set
of participants can form a feasible coalition. One of the most well-known restrictions in
cooperation are the games with limited communication structure as introduced by Myerson
(1977) in which the members of some coalition S can realize the worth v(S) if and only if
they are connected within a given communication graph on the set of players. Solutions for
graph-restricted games studied in the literature are, a.o. the Myerson value (see Myerson
(1977)), the position value (see Borm, Owen and Tijs (1992)) and recently, for cycle-
free graph games the hierarchical outcomes (see Demange (2004)) and their average (see
Herings, van der Laan and Talman (2008)). The hierarchical outcomes are introduced in
Demange (2004) and are extreme points of the Core of the Myerson restricted game in
case the game v is superadditive and the communication graph is a tree. This deﬁnition
can be extended to cycle-free graph games in a straightforward way by deﬁning the payoﬀs
componentwise. This implies that for these graph games also all convex combinations, in
particular the average, of the hierarchical outcomes belong to the Core of the restricted
game. The solution that assigns to every cycle-free graph game the average hierarchical
outcome is introduced in Herings, van der Laan and Talman (2008) as the average tree
solution.
Both the Myerson value as well as the average tree solution are characterized by
component eﬃciency (stating that every component in the communication graph earns
exactly its own worth) and some fairness or equal gain/loss axiom (equalizing the changes in
payoﬀs of certain players after deleting links from the communication graph), see Myerson
(1977), respectively, Herings, van der Laan and Talman (2008). Alternatively, Borm, Owen
and Tijs (1992) provide axiomatizations of the Myerson value and the position value for
cycle-free graph games using component eﬃciency, additivity, the superﬂuous link property
(stating that deleting so-called superﬂuous links does not change the payoﬀ distribution)
and the communication ability property (stating that the players earn equal payoﬀs in case
they are in some sense equal in the communication graph game)1.
1In fact, they apply the communication ability property only to characterize the Myerson value, while
they use the degree property to characterize the position value. But, as shown by van den Brink, van der
Laan and Pruzhansky (2004), both solutions can be characterized by a communication ability property
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It turns out that this axiomatization is very useful in comparing the Myerson value
with the restricted Banzhaf value (i.e. applying the Banzhaf value to the restricted game)
and the average tree solution for cycle-free graph games. From the axioms mentioned above,
the restricted Banzhaf value does not satisfy component eﬃciency. Instead it satisﬁes a
variation of the collusion neutrality axioms of Haller (1994) and Malawski (2002) for TU-
games. These collusion neutrality axioms state that, if two players in a TU-game collude
and act as if they are one player, then the sum of their payoﬀs should not change. For
TU-games, both eﬃciency (stating that the sum of payoﬀs over all players equals the worth
of the ‘grand coalition’ N) and collusion neutrality seem to be desirable properties of which
the Shapley value satisﬁes eﬃciency but not collusion neutrality, and the Banzhaf value
satisﬁes collusion neutrality but not eﬃciency. In van den Brink (2009) it is shown that
there is no solution for TU-games that satisﬁes eﬃciency, collusion neutrality and the null
player property2 (stating that a null player in a game earns a zero payoﬀ). Thus, requiring
eﬃciency and collusion neutrality to be satisﬁed at the same time is very restrictive for
TU-games.
When considering graph restricted games we might also apply the communication
restrictions to certain axioms. For example, eﬃciency is usually strengthened to component
eﬃciency. On the other hand, it seems reasonable to weaken collusion neutrality by allowing
only neighbours in the communication graph to collude. Indeed, it seems counterintuitive
that two players who cannot cooperate because they cannot communicate, would be able
to collude. The restricted Banzhaf value satisﬁes this collusion neutrality and together
with additivity, the superﬂuous link property, the communication ability property and
the isolated player property (stating that players that have no neighbours earn their own
worth) characterizes this solution.
Of course, the restricted Banzhaf value does not satisfy component eﬃciency. As
mentioned above, for TU-games there is no solution satisfying eﬃciency, collusion neutral-
ity and the null player property. However, for cycle-free graph games it turns out that
all hierarchical outcomes3 and their convex combinations4 (thus also the average tree solu-
tion) satisfy component eﬃciency, collusion neutrality and the superﬂuous player property
and a degree measure property, by taking the appropriate power measure for communication graphs.
In particular, the equal power measure for the Myerson value and the degree measure for the so-called
Harsanyi degree solution (wich is equal to the position value on cycle-free graph games and is equal to the
Shapley value on complete graph games).
2There it is also shown that the equal division solution, being the solution that distributes v(N) equally
over all players, is the only solution for TU-games satisfying efficiency, collusion neutrality and symmetry.
3Note that a hierarchical outcome is a payoff vector. If no confusion arises, in the sequel we will refer
also to the solution that assigns to every cycle-free graph game this payoff vector as a hierarchical outcome.
4These convex combinations are the random tree solutions as considered in Be´al, Re´mila and Solal
(2009).
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(stating that a null player in the restricted game earns a zero payoﬀ). Therefore, the ‘im-
possibility’ concerning the existence of a solution for TU-games satisfying these axioms is
‘solved’ when restricting cooperation by allowing only connected coalitions in a cycle-free
communication graph to cooperate and neighbours to collude5. Adding the communication
ability property, the equal gain/loss property (stating that after a collusion of two players,
the payoﬀs of other players change by the same amount) and component independence
characterizes the average tree solution.
From the axioms mentioned above, the Myerson value and the Banzhaf value do not
satisfy the equal gain/loss property (besides component eﬃciency, respectively, collusion
neutrality). However, for the axiomatization of the average tree solution it is suﬃcient
to require the weaker axiom which states that after a collusion between two neighbouring
players that are symmetric in the restricted game, the payoﬀs of other players in the same
component that are symmetric with them, change by the same amount. In this way the
Myerson value, the restricted Banzhaf value and the average tree solution are characterized
by comparable axioms, where the Myerson value and the average tree solution have in
common that they both satisfy component eﬃciency, the average tree solution and the
restricted Banzhaf value have in common that they both satisfy collusion neutrality, and
the Myerson value and the restricted Banzhaf value have in common that they both satisfy
the superﬂuous link property.
It is also clear that the average tree solution satisfying both component eﬃciency
and collusion neutrality goes ‘at a cost’, being that it does not satisfy the superﬂuous link
property. But similar disadvantages can be mentioned for the Myerson value (not satisfying
collusion neutrality) and restricted Banzhaf value (not satisfying component eﬃciency).
Finally, we can easily generalize the above mentioned axiomatizations of the re-
stricted Banzhaf value and the average tree solution in a similar way as done in van den
Brink, van der Laan and Pruzhansky (2004) for the Myerson value, by generalizing the
communication ability property to the σ-communication ability property. For any positive
network power measure6 σ this axiom states that in case the players are in some sense equal
in the communication graph game, then the (Harsanyi) dividends (see Harsanyi (1959))
are allocated proportional to the power of the players in the corresponding coalitions. Ob-
5A well-known result for cycle-free graph games is given by Le Breton, Owen and Weber (1992) and
Demange (1994) who showed that these communication restrictions guarantee the existence of a Core
payoff vector in the restricted game when v is superadditive. Demange (2004) introduced the hierarchical
outcomes as (some) extreme points of this Core.
6A network power measure is a function that assigns to every node in any communication graph a real
number that can be seen as a measure of the ‘power’ or ‘influence’ of that node in the communication
graph. It is positive if it assigns a positive value to every node that has at least one neighbour, and zero
to isolated nodes that have no neighbour.
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viously, taking the equal power measure that assigns to every connected player the same
power (and isolated players having power zero) yields the communication ability property.
For trees (i.e. connected, cycle-free graphs) with a ﬁxed root player i, taking as power
measure the one that assigns in any connected coalition full power to the player that is
‘closest’ to the root player i and assigns power zero to the other players yields (together
with the other axioms used to characterize the average tree solution) an axiomatization of
the corresponding hierarchical outcome with root player i. Another solution is obtained
when taking the degree measure as power measure which, in the axiomatic system of Borm,
Owen and Tijs (1992), yields the position value. In this way we obtain some kind of average
tree-position value and restricted Banzhaf-position value. (Note that the position value
itself does not satisfy collusion neutrality.)
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 contains preliminaries on TU-games, commu-
nication graphs and communication graph games. In Section 3 we provide an axiomatiza-
tion of the restricted Banzhaf value for cycle-free graph games. In Section 4 we axiomatize
the average tree solution for cycle-free graph games. In Section 5 we consider generaliza-
tions of the restricted Banzhaf value and average tree solution (including the hierarchical
outcomes) using network power measures. Finally, Section 6 contains concluding remarks.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Cooperative TU-games
Since in this paper we take the player set N to be ﬁxed, we represent a TU-game (N, v)
just by its characteristic function v. The collection of all TU-games on N (represented by
their characteristic function) is denoted by GN .
A special class of games are the unanimity games. The unanimity game of coalition
T ⊆ N , T 	= ∅, is the game uT ∈ GN given by uT (S) = 1 if T ⊆ S, and uT (S) = 0
otherwise. It is well-known that the unanimity games form a base of GN . Every game
v ∈ GN can be written as a linear combination of unanimity games v =
∑
T⊆N
T =∅
∆v(T )uT
with ∆v(T ) =
∑
S⊆T (−1)
|T |−|S|v(S) being the Harsanyi dividends, see Harsanyi (1959).
A TU-game (N, v) is superadditive if v(S ∪ T ) ≥ v(S) + v(T ) for all S, T ⊆ N with
S ∩ T = ∅, i.e. when two disjoint coalitions cooperate in a superadditive game then it is
always possible to reallocate the worth of these coalitions in such a way that all players in
the coalition beneﬁt (or at least are not worse oﬀ) from the cooperation. We denote the
collection of all superadditive TU-games on N by GNS .
A payoff vector of a game v is an n-dimensional vector x ∈ IRN giving a payoﬀ
xi ∈ IR to player i ∈ N . A payoﬀ vector x is efficient for game v if it exactly distributes
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the worth v(N) of the ‘grand coalition’ N , i.e.,
∑
i∈N xi = v(N). A (single-valued) solution
for TU-games is a function f that assigns to every game v a payoﬀ vector f(v) ∈ IRN . A
solution f is eﬃcient if f(v) is eﬃcient for every game v. The most famous eﬃcient (single-
valued) solution is the Shapley value (Shapley, 1953) being the solution Sh:GN → IRNthat
assigns to every player its expected marginal contribution to the coalition of players that
enter before that player, given that every order of entrance π on N has equal probability
1
n!
to occur, i.e.
Shi(v) =
1
n!
∑
π∈Π(N)
mπi (v) for all i ∈ N,
where Π(N) is the collection of all permutations of N and for π ∈ Π(N),
mπi (v) = v({j ∈ N | π(j) ≤ π(i)})− v({j ∈ N | π(j) < π(i)}) (2.1)
is the marginal contribution of player i to the coalition of all its predecessors in permutation
π.
The non-eﬃcient solution that got most attention in the literature is the Banzhaf
value (introduced by Banzhaf (1965) to measure voting power in voting games and gen-
eralized by Owen (1975) and Dubey and Shapley (1979) to general TU-games) being the
solution Ba:GN → IRN that assigns to every player its expected marginal contribution
given that every combination of the other players has equal probability of being the coali-
tion that is already present when that player enters. Thus, it assigns to every player in a
game its average marginal contribution, i.e.
Bai(v) =
1
2n−1
∑
S⊆N\{i}
mSi (v) for all i ∈ N,
where mSi (v) = v(S ∪ {i})− v(S).
Using the Harsanyi dividends it is also known that the Shapley value and Banzhaf
value can be written as
Shi(v) =
∑
T⊆N
i∈T
∆v(T )
|T |
, respectively, Bai(v) =
∑
T⊆N
i∈T
∆v(T )
2|T |−1
, for all i ∈ N. (2.2)
A set-valued solution for TU-games is a mapping F that assigns to every game v a
set of payoﬀ vectors F (v) ⊂ IRN . A set-valued solution F is eﬃcient if all x ∈ F (v) are
eﬃcient for every game v. The most famous set-valued solution is the Core (Gillies, 1953)
that assigns to every game v the set of all eﬃcient and coalitionally stable payoﬀ vectors,
i.e.,
Core(v) =
{
x ∈ Rn
∣∣∣∣∣∑
i∈N
xi = v(N) and
∑
i∈S
xi ≥ v(S) for all S ⊂ N
}
.
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For general TU-games, a Core payoﬀ vector need not exist, even not for superadditive
games7.
2.2 Graphs
An undirected graph is a pair (N,L) where N is the set of nodes and L ⊆ {{i, j}|i, j ∈
N, i 	= j} is a collection of subsets of N such that each element of L contains precisely two
nodes. The elements of L represent bilateral communication links and are refered to as
edges or links. Since in this paper the nodes in a graph represent the positions of players
in a communication network we refer to the nodes as players. If there is a link between
two players then we call them neighbours and we denote the set of neighbours of player i
by R(N,L)(i) = {j ∈ N | {i, j} ∈ L}. A sequence of k diﬀerent players (i1, . . . , ik) is a path
in (N,L) if {ih, ih+1} ∈ L for all h = 1, . . . , k − 1. Two distinct players i and j, i 	= j, are
connected in graph (N,L) if there is a path (i1, . . . , ik) with i1 = i and ik = j. A graph
(N,L) is connected if any two players i, j ∈ N are connected. For some S ⊆ N , the graph
(S, L(S)) with L(S) = {l ∈ L|l ⊆ S} is called a subgraph of (N,L). For given graph (N,L),
a set of players S is connected when the subgraph (S,L(S)) is connected.
A subset K of N is a component in (N,L) if the subgraph (K,L(K)) is maximally
connected in (N,L), i.e., the subgraph (K,L(K)) is connected, and for any j ∈ N \K, the
subgraph (K ∪{j}, L(K ∪{j})) is not connected in (N,L). For every coalition S ⊆ N , the
components in (S, L(S)) form a partition of S. For graph (N,L) and coalition S ⊆ N we
denote by CL(S) the set of all connected coalitions in (S, L(S)), and by C
m
L (S) the partition
of coalition S into components of (S, L(S)). For i ∈ N , KiL denotes the component of N
in (N,L) to which i belongs.
A path (i1, . . . , ik), k ≥ 3, is a cycle in (N,L) if {ik, i1} ∈ L. A graph (N,L) is
cycle-free when it does not contain any cycle. A player i ∈ N is called a pending player
if it is connected to exactly one other player, i.e., if |{l ∈ L | i ∈ l}| = 1. Note that a
cycle-free communication graph (N,L) with |N | ≥ 2 and L 	= ∅ has at least two pending
players. A graph that is connected and cycle-free is called a tree. We denote by LN the
collection of all sets of links L such that (N,L) is a graph on N . By LNCF we denote the
collection of all sets of links L such that (N,L) is a cycle-free graph on N .
Finally, we denote by D(N,L) = {i ∈ N | R(N,L)(i) 	= ∅} the set of all non-isolated
players in (N,L).
7It is well-known that the Core of a game is nonempty if and only if the game is balanced, see Bondareva
(1963) and Shapley (1967).
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2.3 Graph games and solutions
In a TU-game any subset S ⊆ N is assumed to be able to form a coalition and earn
the worth v(S). However, in most economic and political organizations not every set of
participants can form a feasible coalition. One of the most well-known restrictions on
coalition formation are communication restrictions as introduced in Myerson (1977). In
this model there is a communication network on the set of players in a cooperative game,
and a coalition is feasible if and only if the players in this coalition are connected within
this communication network. The communication network is represented as an undirected
graph (N,L) on the set of players N , where L is the set of binary communication links
between the players. A game v ∈ GN with communication graph (N,L) is shortly denoted
by (v, L) and referred to as a graph game. A (single-valued) solution for graph games is a
function f that assigns a payoﬀ vector f(v, L) ∈ IRN to every graph game (v, L) on N .
In the graph game (v, L) the players in a coalition S can cooperate and earn their
worth v(S) if and only if S is connected in (N,L). If S is not connected we follow Myerson
(1977) and assume that the players in S can only realize the sum of the worths of the
components of S. This yields Myerson (1977)’s restricted game vL given by
vL(S) =
∑
T∈Cm
L
(S)
v(T ), S ⊆ N, (2.3)
where CmL (S) is the partition of S into components. The best-known solution for graph
games is the Myerson value µ which is obtained by assigning to every graph game (v, L)
the Shapley value of the restricted game vL, i.e.,
µ(v, L) = Sh(vL) for all (v, L) ∈ GN ×LN .
This solution is introduced by Myerson (1977) as the unique solution satisfying component
eﬃciency and fairness (the latter axiom stating that deleting a link between two players
changes their payoﬀ by the same amount). Later, Borm, Owen and Tijs (1992) character-
ized this solution on the class of cycle-free graph games by the following four axioms.
Component efficiency For every graph game (v, L) and every component C of N in
(N,L) it holds that
∑
i∈C fi(v, L) = v(C).
Additivity For every pair of graph games (v, L), (w,L) it holds that8 f(v + w,L) =
f(v, L) + f(w,L).
Link l ∈ L is called superfluous in graph game (v, L) if vE(N) = vE∪{l}(N) for all E ⊆ L.
8For two games v,w ∈ GN the sum game is defined by (v +w)(S) = v(S) +w(S) for all S ⊆ N .
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Superfluous link property If l ∈ L is a superﬂuous link in graph game (v, L), then
f(v, L) = f(v, L \ {l}).
A graph game (v, L) is called point unanimous if there is a c∗ ∈ IR such that vL(S) = c∗
for all S ⊆ N with D(N,L) ⊆ S, and vL(S) = 0 for all S ⊆ N with D(N,L) 	⊆ S, i.e., the
corresponding restricted game is a multiple of the unanimity game uD(N,L) with respect to
the set of non-isolated players D(N,L).
Communication ability property If graph game (v, L) is point unanimous, then there
is an α ∈ IR such that fi(v, L) = α for all i ∈ D(N,L), and fi(v, L) = 0 for all
i ∈ N \D(N,L).
Theorem 1 [Borm, Owen and Tijs (1992)]9
The Myerson value is the unique solution on the class of cycle-free graph games satisfy-
ing component efficiency, additivity, the superfluous link property and the communication
ability property.
If the graph (N,L) is a tree (i.e. connected and cycle-free) then we call (v, L) a tree game .
For such tree games, Demange (2004) deﬁnes for every player i ∈ N the corresponding
hierarchical outcome hi(v, L) as the marginal vector mπ(vL) (see (2.1)) of the Myerson
restricted game that is obtained for any permutation of the players that is consistent with
the tree L, i.e. if the path from i to g contains j then π(g) < π(j). In other words, it is
the marginal vector corresponding to a permutation where players enter ‘from the bottom’
when i is the root. Alternatively, deﬁning S
i
j(L) = {g ∈ N | j belongs to the path from
i to g} and Sij(L) = S
i
j(L) ∩ R(N,L)(j) as the set of subordinates, respectively (direct)
successors, of j in the rooted tree with root player i, the hierarchical outcomes are also
given by
hij(v, L) = v(S
i
j(L))−
∑
g∈Sij(L)
v(S
i
g(L)) for all i, j ∈ N.
(Note that j ∈ S
i
j(L) \ S
i
j(L).) Le Breton, Owen and Weber (1992) and Demange (1994)
have shown that the Core of the restricted game vL is nonempty if the game v is super-
additive and the graph L is cycle-free, respectively, a tree. More speciﬁcally, Demange
(2004) shows that in case game v is superadditive and L is a tree, then for any i ∈ N the
hierarchical outcome hi(v, L) is an extreme point of Core(vL). (Note that there can be
other extreme points of the Core that are not hierarchical outcomes.) By convexity of the
9Borm, Owen and Tijs (1992) define a stronger version of the communication ability property using
point anonymous games, but as mentioned in van den Brink, van der Laan and Pruzhansky (2004) they
only apply the weaker version as stated here.
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Core, this implies that all convex combinations of hierarchical outcomes are Core elements.
In particular, the average hierarchical outcome of tree game (v, L)
AHO(v, L) =
1
n
∑
i∈N
hi(v, L)
belongs to the Core of vL. Herings, van der Laan and Talman (2008) extend this deﬁnition
to cycle-free graph games, by determining the average payoﬀ of a player only over the
hierarchical outcomes in its own component10, i.e.
AHOj(v, L) =
1
|KjL|
∑
i∈Kj
L
hij(v |KiL, L(K
i
L))
=
1
|KjL|
∑
i∈Kj
L

v(Sij(L))− ∑
g∈Sij(L)
v(S
i
g(L))

 for all j ∈ N.
They deﬁne the average tree solution AT as the solution that assigns to every cycle-
free graph game its average hierarchical outcome11, and provide an axiomatization by
component eﬃciency and an alternative fairness axiom, refered to as component fairness
(stating that deleting a link between two players changes the average payoﬀ of the players
in the two new components that arise by the same amount.) Moreover, they characterize
the average tree solution as the Harsanyi power solution (see van den Brink, van der Laan
and Pruzhansky (2004)) given by
ATi(v, L) =
∑
T∈CL(N)
i∈T
1 + pLT (i)
|T |+
∑
j∈T p
L
T (j)
∆vL(T ), i ∈ N, (2.4)
where pLT (j) =
∑
g∈N\T
{j,g}∈L
|Kg
L\{j,g}|, j ∈ N .
3 An axiomatization of the restricted Banzhaf value
for cycle-free graph games
In this section we consider the restricted Banzhaf value for cycle-free communication graph
games that is obtained by applying the Banzhaf value to the restricted game, i.e. we
consider the solution β given by
β(v, L) = Ba(vL) for all (v, L) ∈ GN × LN .
10To be precise, for the first equality we should define solutions also for subgames (K, v|K , L(K)),
K ∈ Cm
L
(N), with v|K(S) = v(S) for all S ⊆ K, but since we only use these subgames to compute
hierarchical outcomes in the cycle-free graph game (N,v, L) we just write graph games as (v, L).
11A generalization for arbitrary graph games can be found in Herings, van der Laan, Talman and Yang
(2008)
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Haller (1994) introduced some collusion neutrality properties which state that the sum
of payoﬀs of two players does not change if they ‘collude’. He used these properties to
axiomatize the Banzhaf value. Later, Malawski (2002) showed that several other collusion
neutrality properties can be used12. In this paper we consider collusion between two players
where they agree to ‘act as one’ in the sense that they contribute to a coalition only when
they both are present13. So, when players i, j ∈ N , i 	= j, collude in game v ∈ GN , then
instead of game v we consider the game vij ∈ GN given by
vij(S) =
{
v(S \ {i, j}) if {i, j} 	⊆ S
v(S) if {i, j} ⊆ S.
(3.5)
Applying this idea to communication graph games, it seems reasonable to weaken collusion
neutrality by allowing only neighbours in the communication graph to collude. Indeed, it
seems counterintuitive that two players who cannot cooperate because they cannot com-
municate would be able to collude, since collusion is a stronger form of coalition formation
then cooperation.
Collusion neutrality If {i, j} ∈ L then fi(vij, L) + fj(vij, L) = fi(v, L) + fj(v, L), where
vij is given by (3.5).
Next, the isolated player property states that isolated players just earn their singleton
worth.
Isolated player property If R(N,L)(i) = ∅ then fi(v, L) = v({i}).
The restricted Banzhaf value is characterized by collusion neutrality, additivity, the super-
ﬂuous link property, the communication ability property and the isolated player property.
Theorem 2 The restricted Banzhaf value is the unique solution for cycle-free graph games
that satisfies collusion neutrality, additivity, the superfluous link property, the communica-
tion ability property and the isolated player property.
Proof
It is straightforward to verify that the restricted Banzhaf value satisﬁes these ﬁve axioms.
To show uniqueness, suppose that solution f satisﬁes these ﬁve axioms for cycle-free graph
games.
12A characterization of the Banzhaf value with collusion properties in terms of inequalities can be found
in Lehrer (1988).
13This is a collusion game as used by Malawski (2002), but the results of this paper, in particular
Theorems 2 and 4, also hold when taking the collusion games of Haller (1994).
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First, consider cycle-free graph game (cuT , L), c ∈ IR, c 	= 0, ∅ 	= T ⊆ N . If L = L
∅ := ∅,
then the isolated player property implies that fi(cuT , L
∅) = v({i}) for all i ∈ N . For
L 	= L∅ we distinguish the following two cases.
(i) If there is no component C in (N,L) such that T ⊆ C then all links are superﬂuous,
and the superﬂuous link property implies that f(cuT , L) = f(cuT , L
∅). (Note that in this
case |T | ≥ 2.) Thus, fi(cuT , L) = v({i}) = 0 for all i ∈ N as determined above.
(ii) If there is a component C in (N,L) such that T ⊆ C then consider the connected hull
H(T ) = {h ∈ N | there exist i, j ∈ T such that h belongs to the path between i and j}
of T . (Note that in a cycle-free graph there is exactly one path between any pair of
connected players.) Since (cuT , L(H(T ))) is point unanimous, the communication ability
property implies that there is an α ∈ IR such that fi(cuT , L(H(T ))) = α for all i ∈ H(T ),
and fi(cuT , L(H(T ))) = 0 for all i ∈ N \H(T ). Since all links outside the connected hull
of T are superﬂuous, the superﬂuous link property implies that
fi(cuT , L) = fi(cuT , L(H(T ))) =
{
α for all i ∈ H(T )
0 for all i ∈ N \H(T ).
(3.6)
We prove uniqueness of f(cuT , L) by induction on |H(T )|. If |H(T )| = 1 then the isolated
player property implies that α = c, and thus f(cuT , L) = β(cuT , L) is determined with
(3.6) and (2.2).
Proceeding by induction, suppose that α = c
2|H(T
′)|−1 has been determined whenever |H(T
′)| <
|H(T )|. Since L is cycle-free, there is a j ∈ T such that |R(N,L(H(T )))(j)| = 1, i.e. j is a
pending player in (N,L(H(T ))). Let h ∈ R(N,L(H(T )))(j) ∩H(T ) be the unique neighbour
of j in (N,L(H(T ))). We distinguish two cases:
Case A. Suppose that h ∈ T . Consider the game cuT\{j}. Since H(T \ {j}) = H(T ) \ {j},
with the induction hypothesis it follows that fh(cuT\{j}, L) =
c
2|H(T\{j})|−1
= c
2|H(T )|−2
and
fj(cuT\{j}, L) = 0.
Since (uT\{j})hj = uT , collusion neutrality implies that fh(cuT , L)+fj(cuT , L) = fh(cuT\{j}, L)+
fj(cuT\{j}, L) =
c
2|H(T )|−2
+ 0 = c
2|H(T )|−2
.
By (3.6) and h, j ∈ H(T ) we then have that α = c
2|H(T )|−1
, and thus f(cuT , L) = β(cuT , L).
Case B. Suppose that h 	∈ T . Consider the game cuT∪{h}. Since H(T ∪ {h}) = H(T ),
according to Case A, f(cuT∪{h}, L) = β(cuT∪{h}, L) is determined. Since cuT∪{h} = (cuT )jh,
by collusion neutrality we have that fh(cuT , L)+fj(cuT , L) = fh(cuT∪{h}, L)+fj(cuT∪{h}, L) =
c
2|H(T )|−2
. By (3.6) we again have that α = c
2|H(T )|−1
, and thus f(cuT , L) = β(cuT , L).
So, f(cuT , L) = β(cuT , L) is uniquely determined in both cases.
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Obviously, for the null game given by v0(S) = 0 for all S ⊆ N , the superﬂuous link
property and the isolated player property imply that fi(v0, L) = fi(v0, L
∅) = 0 = βi(v0, L)
for all i ∈ N .
Finally, since every v ∈ GN can be written as a linear combination of unanimity games in
a unique way as v =
∑
T⊆N
T =∅
∆v(T )uT , additivity implies that fi(v, L) =
∑
T⊆N
i∈H(T )
∆
vL
(T )
2|H(T )|−1
=
βi(v, L), i ∈ N , is uniquely determined for all (v, L) ∈ GN × LNCF . 
Note that the Myerson value also satisﬁes the isolated player property. So, the diﬀerence in
the axiomatizations given in Theorems 1 and 2 is the Myerson value satisfying component
eﬃciency, and the restricted Banzhaf value satisfying collusion neutrality14.
4 Hierarchical outcomes and an axiomatization of the
average tree solution for cycle-free graph games
Both component eﬃciency and collusion neutrality seem to be desirable properties. For
TU-games, van den Brink (2009) has shown that there is no solution satisfying eﬃciency,
collusion neutrality and the null player property. However, when we allow collusion to occur
only between neighbours in a cycle-free communication graph, then there are solutions that
satisfy component eﬃciency, collusion neutality and the superﬂuous player property. A
player i ∈ N is called superfluous in graph game (v, L) if it is a null player in the restricted
game, i.e, if vL(S) = vL(S \ {i}) for all S ⊆ N . The next axiom is introduced in van den
Nouweland (1993) and states that such superﬂuous players earn zero payoﬀ.
Axiom 1 (Superfluous player property) If i ∈ N is a superflous player in graph game
(v, L) then fi(v, L) = 0.
In the following, we will often refer to the solution that assigns to every tree game (v, L),
the payoﬀ vector hi(v, L) simply as the hierarchical outcome15 corresponding to player i, or
the solution hi. It is easy to verify that all hierarchical outcomes satisfy these three axioms
for tree games. Moreover, this holds for all their convex combinations. In particular, the
average tree solution satisﬁes these three properties on the class of cycle-free graph games.
(The straightforward proof is left for the reader.)
14Similar as done for games with a hierarchical permision structure in van den Brink (2000), the Myerson
value can be characterized using a ‘grand’ version of collusion neutrality stating that if two neighbours in
a graph game collude then the total sum of payoffs over all players does not change.
15Similar, in the literature the Core often refers to the set of efficient, group stable payoff vectors of a
game, as well as the solution that assigns this set to every game.
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Proposition 3 All solutions hi, i ∈ N , satisfy component efficiency, collusion neutrality
and the superfluous player property on the class of tree games. The average tree solution
satisfies these properties on the class of cycle-free graph games.
Thus, the ‘impossibility’ concerning the existence of a solution for TU-games satisfying
eﬃciency, collusion neutrality and the null player property is ‘solved’ when restricting
cooperation by allowing only connected coalitions in a cycle-free communication graph to
cooperate and only neighbours can collude.
To axiomatize the average tree solution, we further use additivity and two other
axioms. First, the equal gain/loss property states that collusion of two players has the same
eﬀect on the payoﬀs of other players16. Again, we only allow collusion among neighbours
in the communication graph.
Axiom 2 (Equal gain/loss property) If {i, j} ∈ L then fh(vij, L)−fh(v, L) = fg(vij, L)−
fg(v, L) for all h, g ∈ N \ {i, j}.
Finally, we use the axiom which states that payoﬀs in one component do not depend on
the game in and structure of other components.
Axiom 3 (Component independence) If v, w ∈ GN and L,L′ ∈ LN are such that
v(S) = w(S) for all S ⊆ T ∈ CmL (N)∩C
m
L′(N), and L(T ) = L
′(T ), then fi(v, L) = fi(w,L
′)
for all i ∈ T .
Next, we state an axiomatization of the average tree solution for cycle-free graph games17.
Theorem 4 The average tree solution is the unique solution for cycle-free graph games
that satisfies component efficiency, collusion neutrality, additivity, the communication abil-
ity property, the superfluous player property, the equal gain/loss property and component
independence.
16Note that this also can be seen as some kind of fairness axiom concerning collusion of players.
17The hierarchical outcomes and the average tree solution satisfy the no gain/loss property, which is
stronger than the equal gain/loss property, and states that after a collusion of two neighbours the payoffs
of the other players do not change. After communicating Theorem 4 and this remark by e-mail and
in personal communication with Dolf Talman, in Mishra and Talman (2009) it is shown that using this
no gain/loss property instead of the equal gain/loss property, we do not need collusion neutrality to
characterize the average tree solution for cycle-free graph games. In fact they use a weaker version of the
no gain/loss property, refered to as independence in unanimity games, which requires this property only
for unanimity games and connected coalitions. Note that, as usual, in the proof of Theorem 4 all axioms,
except additivity, are applied only to unanimity games.
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Proof
Using (2.4) and Proposition 3 it is straightforward to verify that the average tree solution
satisﬁes these seven axioms.
To show uniqueness, suppose that solution f satisﬁes these seven axioms for cycle-free
graph games.
First, consider graph game (cuT , L), c ∈ IR, c 	= 0, ∅ 	= T ⊆ N . If L = L∅ = ∅, then
component eﬃciency implies that fi(cuT , L
∅) = v({i}) for all i ∈ N . Next, for L 	= L∅ we
distinguish the same two cases as in the proof of Theorem 2 (which, however, are treated
diﬀerent).
(i) If there is no component C in (N,L) such that T ⊆ C then all players are superﬂuous,
and the superﬂuous player property implies that fi(cuT , L) = 0 for all i ∈ N .
(ii) If there is a component C in (N,L) such that T ⊆ C then component independence
implies that f(cuT , L) = f(cuT , L(C)). Component eﬃciency
18 implies that
fi(cuT , L) = fi(cuT , L(C)) = 0 for all i ∈ N \ C. (4.7)
We prove uniqueness of f(cuT , L) by induction on |H(T )| (i.e. the number of players in the
connected hull of T ), but now starting with |H(T )| = |C|. If |H(T )| = |C| then (cuT , L(C))
is point unanimous, and thus the communication ability property implies that there is an
α ∈ IR such that fi(cuT , L) = α for all i ∈ C. Component eﬃciency then determines that
α = c|C| , and thus with component independence we have that
fi(cuT , L) = fi(cuT , L(C)) =
{
c
|C| if i ∈ C
0 otherwise.
Proceeding by induction, suppose that f(cuT ′ , L) has been uniquely determined whenever
|H(T ′)| > |H(T )|. Since H(T ) 	= C, there exists a h ∈ H(T ) such that R(N,L)(h) \H(T ) 	=
∅. Take such an h and j ∈ R(N,L)(h) \H(T ).
We distinguish the same two cases as in the proof of Theorem 2:
Case A. Suppose that h ∈ T .
Since j 	∈ T , we have that (cuT )hj = cuT∪{j}, and thus collusion neutrality implies that
fj(cuT , L) + fh(cuT , L) = fj(cuT∪{j}, L) + fh(cuT∪{j}, L). (4.8)
The superﬂuous player property implies that fj(cuT , L) = 0.
Since |H(T ∪ {j})| = |H(T )| + 1, the payoﬀ vector f(cuT∪{j}, L) is determined by the
induction hypothesis. Therefore, by (4.8), fh(cuT , L) = fh(cuT∪{j}, L) + fj(cuT∪{j}, L) −
fj(cuT , L) is uniquely determined.
18The same follows from the superfluous player property.
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The equal gain/loss property implies that there is a β ∈ IR such that fi(cuT , L) =
fi(cuT∪{h}, L)+ β for all i ∈ H(T ) \ {h}. Again, by the induction hypothesis f(cuT∪{h}, L)
is determined. Since fi(cuT , L) = 0 for all i ∈ N \H(T ) by the superﬂuous player property,
and fh(cuT , L) is determined above, component eﬃciency determines β. Thus, f(cuT , L)
is determined.
Case B. Suppose that h 	∈ T . Consider the game cuT∪{h}. Since H(T ∪ {h}) = H(T ),
according to Case A, f(cuT∪{h}, L) is uniquely determined. Since h ∈ H(T ) \ T there
exist at least two paths (h1, . . . , hp) and (z1, . . . , zq) such that h1 = z1 = h, {hp, zq} ⊆
T, {h1, . . . , hp−1} ∩ T = ∅, {z1, . . . , zq−1} ∩ T = ∅ and {h1, . . . , hp} ∩ {z1, . . . , zq} = {h}.
First, consider the path (h1, . . . , hp). Since (cuT∪{h})hh2 = cuT∪{h,h2}, collusion neutrality
implies that fh(cuT∪{h,h2}, L) + fh2(cuT∪{h,h2}, L) = fh(cuT∪{h}, L) + fh2(cuT∪{h}, L) is de-
termined since f(cuT∪{h}, L) is determined. Component eﬃciency and the equal gain loss
property19 then determine the payoﬀs fg(cuT∪{h,h2}, L) for all g ∈ N \ {h, h2}.
Since (cuT∪{h2})h2h = cuT∪{h,h2}, again applying collusion neutrality yields that fh(cuT∪{h2}, L)+
fh2(cuT∪{h2}, L) = fh(cuT∪{h,h2}, L)+fh2(cuT∪{h,h2}, L) is determined. Again by component
eﬃciency and the equal gain loss property the payoﬀs fg(cuT∪{h2}, L) are determined for
all g ∈ N \ {h, h2}.
Repeated application of this argument we end up20 with game cuT , and thus fg(cuT , L)
are determined for all g ∈ N \ {h1, . . . , hp}.
Applying a similar reasoning to the path (z1, . . . , zq) yields that fg(cuT , L) are determined
for all g ∈ N \ {z1, . . . , zq}.
So, all payoﬀs fg(cuT , L), g ∈ (N \ {h1, . . . , hp}) ∪ (N \ {z1, . . . , zq}) = N \ {h}, are
determined. Component eﬃciency then determines fh(cuT , L).
So, in both cases f(cuT , L) is uniquely determined.
Obviously, for the null game given by v0(S) = 0 for all S ⊆ N , the superﬂuous player
property implies that fi(v0, L) = fi(v0, L
∅) = 0 for all i ∈ N .
Since every arbitrary v ∈ GN can be written as a linear combination of unanimity games in
a unique way as v =
∑
T⊆N
T =∅
∆v(T )uT , additivity implies that fi(v, L) is uniquely determined
for all (v, L) ∈ GN ×LNCF . 
From the proof it also follows that deleting component independence from the axioms,
characterizes the average tree solution for tree games as considered in Demange (1994,
19This also follows from the equal gain/loss property and the superfluous player property since player j
is superfluous in both games and thus earns zero in both games.
20In the last step we apply this argument to (cuT )hphp−1 = cuT∪{hp−1}.
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2004).
Since the set-valued solution that assigns to every cycle-free graph game the Core
of the restricted game satisﬁes component eﬃciency, the superﬂuous player property and
component independence21, as a corollary of Theorem 4 and Demange (2004)’s result that
every hierarchical outcome is an extreme point of the Core of the restricted game if v is
superadditive and L is cycle-free, and the Core of a game being a convex set, we obtain
that the average tree solution is the unique solution for cycle-free graph games that satisﬁes
collusion neutrality, additivity, the communication ability property, the equal gain/loss
property and is Core stable for superadditive games22.
Corollary 5 The average tree solution is the unique solution f for cycle-free graph games
that satisfies collusion neutrality, additivity, the communication ability property, the equal
gain/loss property and is such that f(v, L) ∈ Core(vL) for all (v, L) ∈ GNS × L
N
CF .
Proof
Since all positively scaled unanimity games are superadditive, it follows similar as the proof
of Theorem 4 that f(cuT , L) is uniquely determined for all c > 0, ∅ 	= T ⊆ N and L ∈ LNCF .
Next, consider (cuT , L) with c < 0. Since −cuT is superadditive and cuT + (−cuT ) is
the null game (i.e. (cuT + (−cuT ))(S) = 0 for all S ⊆ N), it follows from additivity
of f and the fact that fi(cuT + (−cuT ), L) = 0 for all i ∈ N (by Core stability), that
f(cuT , L) = f(cuT + (−cuT ), L) − f(−cuT , L) = −f(−cuT , L) is uniquely determined
because −cuT is superadditive.
Obviously, for the null game given by v0(S) = 0 for all S ⊆ N , Core stability implies that
fi(v0, L) = fi(v0, L
∅) = 0 for all i ∈ N .
Again, additivity then determines f(v, L) for all v ∈ GN and L ∈ LNCF . 
From the axioms of Theorem 4, both the Myerson value and the Banzhaf value do not
satisfy the equal gain/loss property. However, Theorem 4 can also be stated using the
weaker axiom which states that after a collusion as described by vij in (3.5) between
players i and j that are symmetric23 in the restricted game, the payoﬀs of other symmetric
players in the same component change by the same amount24.
21Of course, these properties should be defined for set-valued solutions.
22A similar corollary was stated by Herings, van der Laan and Talman (2008) with their axiomatization
using component fairness.
23Players i, j ∈ N are symmetric in a game v ∈ GN if v(S ∪ {i}) = v(S ∪ {j}) for all S ⊆ N \ {i, j}.
24This can be seen since in the proof of Theorem 4 we need to apply the equal gain/loss property only to
players in H(T ). Although the second and third time we apply this axiom to all players in N \ {h, h2}, we
could instead apply the superfluous player property to players outside H(T ), and the weak equal gain/loss
property to players in H(T ) \ {h, h2}.
16
Axiom 4 (Weak equal gain/loss property) Let i, j ∈ N be symmetric players in vL
such that {i, j} ∈ L. Then fh(vij , L)−fh(v, L) = fg(vij, L)−fg(v, L) for all h, g ∈ KiL\{i, j}
that are symmetric with i, j in vL.
Replacing the equal gain/loss property by this weak equal gain/loss property in Theorem
4, the axioms that characterize the average tree solution are also satisﬁed by the Myerson
value (except collusion neutrality) and the restricted Banzhaf value (except component
eﬃciency). Therefore, we obtained comparable axiomatizations of these three solutions,
where the Myerson value and the average tree solution have in common that they both
satisfy component eﬃciency, the average tree solution and the restricted Banzhaf value
have in common that they both satisfy collusion neutrality, and the Myerson value and
the restricted Banzhaf value have in common that they both satisfy the superﬂuous link
property, see Table 1. In this way it is also clear that the average tree solution satisfying
both component eﬃciency and collusion neutrality goes ‘at a cost’, since it does not satisfy
the superﬂuous link property. However, similar disadvantages can be stated for the Myerson
value (which does not satisfy collusion neutrality) and the restricted Banzhaf value (which
is not component eﬃcient).
Comp. eﬀ. Collusion neutr. Superﬂ. link prop.
Myerson value + - +
restricted Banzhaf value - + +
average tree solution + + -
Table 1: Properties of Myerson value, restricted Banzhaf value and average tree solution
for cycle-free graph games
5 A generalization using network power measures
In van den Brink, van der Laan and Pruzhansky (2004), the communication ability prop-
erty is generalized allowing the payoﬀs in point unanimous graph games to be allocated
according to any positive symmetric power measure. A power measure is a function σ that
assigns to any graph (S, L), S ⊆ N , a nonnegative vector σ(S,L) ∈ IR|S|+ , yielding the non-
negative power σi(S, L) of node i ∈ S in the graph (S, L).25 A power measure is symmetric
if for any graph (S, L), S ⊆ N , and i, j ∈ S such that R(S,L)(i) \ {j} = R(S,L)(j) \ {i}, we
25So, a power measure on N assigns power values to nodes in all subgraphs on S ⊆ N .
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have σi(S, L) = σj(S,L). It is positive if for any (S,L), the power of node i is positive if
and only if i is non-isolated (and thus node i has zero power if it is isolated).
Given a positive power measure σ, van den Brink, van der Laan and Pruzhansky
(2004) deﬁne the corresponding Harsanyi power solution, denoted by ϕσ, on the class
of all graph games on player set N as the solution that distributes the dividend of any
(connected) coalition in the restricted game vL proportional to the σ-power of the players
in the corresponding subgraph, i.e.
ϕσi (v, L) = v({i}) +
∑
S∈CL(N), |S|≥2
i∈S
σi(S, L(S))∑
j∈N σj(S, L(S))
∆vL(S).
Note that for any positive power measure and connected coalition S ∈ CL(N) with |S| ≥ 2
it holds that
∑
j∈S σj(S, L(S)) > 0. Moreover, for every nonconnected coalition S 	∈ CL(N)
it holds that ∆vL(S) = 0, so all Harsanyi power solutions satisfy component eﬃciency.
The σ-communication ability property states that in case the graph game is point
unanimous, the dividends are allocated proportional to the power values of the players in
the graph.
σ-Communication ability property If (v, L) is point unanimous, then there is α ∈ IR
such that f(v, L) = ασ(N,L).
Obviously, we have the communication ability property in case we take the equal power
measure that assigns the same positive power value to all players that have at least one
neighbour, and assigns value zero to all isolated players.
In a similar way as Theorem 1 is generalized in van den Brink, van der Laan and
Pruzhansky (2004), we can generalize Theorems 2 and 4.
Theorem 6 For a positive power measure σ,
(i) there is a unique solution for cycle-free graph games that satisfies collusion neutral-
ity, additivity, the superfluous link property, the isolated player property and the
σ-communication ability property.
(ii) there is a unique solution for cycle-free graph games that satisfies component efficiency,
collusion neutrality, additivity, the superfluous player property, the equal gain/loss
property, component independence and the σ-communication ability property.
In particular, by taking σ to be the degree measure we obtain some kind of average tree-
position value and restricted Banzhaf-position value26.
26Note that the position value itself does not satisfy collusion neutrality.
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Similar as Theorem 4, Theorem 6.(ii) can be modiﬁed for tree games by deleting
component independence. Then, we obtain axiomatizations of the hierarchical outcomes
for tree games by taking appropriate power measures. Let (N,L) be a tree. For player
i ∈ N , take the power measure σi (on trees) as the one that assigns for every tree (N,L)
positive power to player i, and assigns power zero to all other players, i.e.
σij(S, L(S)) =
{
1 if j = i
0 otherwise.
Although this is not a positive power measure, we have the following. (The proof is left
for the reader.)
Theorem 7 The solution hi, i ∈ N , is the unique solution for tree games that satisfies ef-
ficiency, collusion neutrality, additivity, the superfluous player property, the equal gain/loss
property and the σi-communication ability property.
Again this also yields a characterization using the Core property.
Corollary 8 The solution hi, i ∈ N , is the unique solution f for tree games that satisfies
collusion neutrality, additivity, the equal gain/loss property, the σi-communication ability
property, and is such that f(v, L) ∈ Core(vL) for all (v, L) ∈ GNS × L
N
CF .
Adding the following property we obtain a characterization of the class of hierarchical
outcomes as a corollary.
root communication ability property There exists an i ∈ N such that fj(v, L) = 0
for all j ∈ N \ {i}, whenever (v, L) is point unanimous.
This is some kind of representation property which states that in a point unanimous graph
game all payoﬀ goes to one player.
Theorem 9 A solution for tree games is a hierarchical outcome if and only if it satisfies
component efficiency, collusion neutrality, additivity, the superfluous player property, the
equal gain/loss property and the root communication ability property.
6 Concluding remarks
In this paper we gave axiomatizations of the Myerson value, the restricted Banzhaf value
and the average tree solution, where the diﬀerence between these solutions is with respect
to the axioms of component eﬃciency (satisﬁed by the Myerson value and the average tree
solution) collusion neutrality (satisﬁed by the restricted Banzhaf value and the average
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tree solution) and the superﬂuous link property (satisﬁed by the Myerson value and the
restricted Banzhaf value).
As mentioned before, collusion neutrality properties are discussed by Haller (1994)
and Malawski (2002) to characterize the (non-eﬃcient) Banzhaf value for TU-games. In
van den Brink (2009) it is shown that there is no solution that satisﬁes eﬃciency, collusion
neutrality and the null player property. In that sense, restricting cooperation by allowing
only connected coalitions in a cycle-free communication graph to cooperate and neighbours
to collude ‘solves’ this impossibility.
As argued by Haller (1994), collusion neutrality can be seen as some kind of sta-
bility property. According to a solution that satisﬁes collusion neutrality, players have
no incentive to merge or split in separate players. Similar, Le Breton, Owen and Weber
(1992) and Demange (1994) have shown that the communication restrictions that arise
from cycle-free graphs guarantee the existence of a Core payoﬀ vector in the restricted
game when v is superadditive, while Demange (2004) introduced the hierarchical outcomes
as extreme points of this Core. This shows that situations in which cooperation among
players can be modelled as a cycle-free graph game has appealing properties concerning
Core stability and collusion neutrality. Examples of such situations are sequencing games
(see, e.g. Curiel, Pederzoli and Tijs (1989)), auction games (see Graham, Marshall and
Richard (1990)), dual airport games (see Littlechild and Owen (1973)), river games (see
Ambec and Sprumont (2002)) and polluted river games (see Ni and Wang (2007)).
In games with hierarchies, collusion neutrality properties are applied to characterize
the Banzhaf value in, e.g. van den Brink (2002) for apex games, van den Brink (2000)
for games with a permission structure and in Algaba, Bilbao, van den Brink and Jime´nez-
Losada (2004b) for games on antimatroids. In van den Brink (2006) the sets of feasible
coalitions arising as connected coalitions from a communication graph (and more speciﬁc
cycle-free and cycle-complete communication graphs) are characterized by similar proper-
ties that deﬁne an antimatroid. This motivates to apply antimatroids in studying hierar-
chies to make comparisons with communication networks, and to further study properties
like component eﬃciency and collusion neutrality for these models. Adding properties to
the sets of feasible coalitions lead to other (some well-known) models. For example, the
sets of feasible coalitions arising from conjunctive permission structures (see Gilles, owen
and van den Brink (1992) and van den Brink and Gilles (1996)) are characterized as those
antimatroids that are colsed under intersection (see Algaba, Bilbao, van den Brink and
Jime´nez-Losada (2004a)), while the sets of connected coalitions in communication graphs
that are closed under intersection are exactly those arising from cycle-complete commu-
nication graphs (see van den Brink (2006)). In voting, van den Brink, Rusinowska and
Steﬀen (2009) applied collusion neutrality properties for measures of power and success in
20
situations where some voters are inﬂuenced by other voters (their peers) in casting their
vote, i.e. a voter might vote against its own inclination when a suﬃcient number of its
peers cast the same vote.
Another question for further study is the exploration of the classes of solutions
determined by Theorem 6, and other classes of solutions that satisfy component eﬃciency
and collusion neutrality. Adding more axioms is very restrictive for TU-games27 but, as
seen in this paper, yields interesting possibilities for cycle-free graph games.
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